

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

INFORMATION  
August 10, 1971

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Per NSC letter 10/25/92  
By: [signature] Date: 12/2/92

MEMORANDUM FOR: HENRY A. KISSINGER  
FROM: W. R. SMYER/WINSTON LORD  
SUBJECT: Updated Report on Where We Stand  
in Paris

Attached is an updated version of the report on where we stand on the principal issues in Paris. This follows the format of the earlier version, comparing the formal positions of both sides and the verbal amplifications through the July 26 meeting, as well as what the Current Situation now looks like. In addition, we have added a section on the question of Procedure, i. e., what type of issue is discussed in what forum.

We have put a copy of this into your briefing book along with other appropriate background material.

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NVN AND US POSITIONS ON KEY ISSUES  
(through July 12, 1971)

WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES

Their Position

Point 1: "The withdrawal of the totality of U.S. forces and those of foreign countries in the U.S. camp from South Vietnam and other Indochinese countries should be completed within 1971."

Point 6: "The problems existing among the Indochinese countries should be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs. As far as it is concerned, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is prepared to join in resolving such problems."

Our Position

Point 1: "We are prepared to set a terminal date for the withdrawal of all our forces from South Vietnam. We would arrange for roughly the same timetable for the withdrawal of other Allied forces."

Point 2: "The Vietnamese and the other peoples of Indochina should discuss among themselves the manner in which all other outside forces would withdraw from the countries of Indochina."

Their July 12 Statements

Xuan Thuy:

"If we propose 1971, let you now propose another date and we shall examine the dates to see which one is more reasonable."

Tho specifically said that they had not agreed to our Point 2, and proposed their Point 6 instead.

The withdrawal should not be linked to a general cease-fire, which should follow only upon a general agreement.

Our July 12 Statements

"We are prepared to give you a date for the total withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces as the first item of business once we have come to an

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agreement on the framework. We agree that this be the first item of business and that it would be mutually agreed."

"The Minister has let his optimism run away with him." (re 1971)

"We maintain Point 2 of our 7 point proposal." We pointed out that it was Point 3 of their old 10 points.

"We believe that the principle should be accepted that the troops of each of the countries of Indochina should stay within their borders. But we agree that the details of this can be discussed among the countries of Indochina."

#### Their July 26 Statements

Xuan Thuy: "You said that you agreed to the principle of U.S. troop withdrawal linked with the question of prisoners. These two operations begin on the same date and end on the same date. But what is important is a date on which U.S. troop withdrawal would be completed. . . As for us, we have been clear in saying that the troop withdrawal from South Vietnam and other Indochinese countries should be completed by 1971."

Xuan Thuy: "I think in your Point 2 you raise the question of mutual withdrawals. But previously you said you would not put on the same legal footing U.S. forces and Vietnamese forces fighting against aggression."

Le Duc Tho: This question cannot be put in such a way. We have put the problem in our Point 6. . . And I cannot give an answer to your question to settle this problem since you have not fixed any date for withdrawal and you have not answered our Point 3 about maintaining the Thieu Administration."

Xuan Thuy: "Now, about the time limit for troop withdrawals. First, you say that the period of nine months is based on my view. It is not true. My view concerns a terminal date. . . There should be a terminal date, so that you will make an effort to fulfill things at that date. Nine months is new; it is a shorter period than twelve months, but without a fixed date it is the same."

#### Our July 26 Statements

"We are prepared to fix a date for the withdrawal of all our forces as well as the forces allied with us, to be completed nine months after the signature of an agreement."

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"We propose the withdrawal of all organized military forces; all bases, purely American bases, will be given up; and the withdrawal of all advisers with combat units."

"We would propose to keep a very small number of technical and logistic personnel to supervise American equipment, a number fixed in the agreement and progressively reduced. . . All the equipment belong to American forces will be withdrawn, not material that belongs to South Vietnamese forces. . . There are two things: first, these personnel would help for a limited time to maintain and train Vietnamese personnel in the technical aspects of complex equipment of South Vietnamese units; second, they would supervise distribution of whatever new equipment would be permitted in the agreement. We are talking here of very small numbers; we are not talking about tens of thousands. This is a number we can specify in the agreement and progressively reduce to a normal military attache office with a slightly enlarged function."

"I frankly have no precise numbers. . . But I can tell you that it will be considerably smaller than the number of troops in the country when combat troops were sent in 1964. I would think, without giving specific figures, that the number that would be left when withdrawals are completed would be considerably less than 10,000 and would be progressively reduced thereafter. And there would not be any organized military units."

[later]  
The number of those remaining in the military attache office "will be much less than 1,000." The functions "will be confined to the technical equipment and would have nothing to do with combat. . . No training," except for maintaining equipment. "We could agree to end the training function for everything, say a year after the total withdrawal of U.S. forces."

"All you have to do is sign an agreement and there will be a terminal date nine months later."

"We have agreed that [the withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces] should be discussed in another forum, but we want to know if you agree in principle that the forces of North Vietnam should remain within the frontiers of North Vietnam like the forces of others will do."

"And I will in turn look at your problem concerning technical advisers."

#### Current Situation

We have accepted Hanoi's demand that we set a date, and we have said that we will withdraw our forces within nine months after an agreement is reached, but disagreement or ambiguity remains about:

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- Setting a terminal date before agreement.
- Length of timetable.
- The arrangement for the disposition of other outside forces, e.g., the North Vietnamese.
- The relationship between withdrawals and a general cease-fire.
- The remaining U.S. technical personnel, their numbers and functions.
- The pace and composition of withdrawals within agreed timetables.

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NVN AND US POSITIONS ON KEY ISSUES  
(through July 12, 1971)

POW'S

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Their Position

Point 2: "The release of all military men and civilians captured in the war should be carried out in parallel and completed at the same time as the troop withdrawals mentioned in Point 1."

Our Position

Point 7: "I want to reiterate our proposal for the immediate release of all prisoners of war and innocent civilians held by both sides throughout Indochina. We believe this issue should be settled immediately on a humanitarian basis. If this is not done, the men must be released as an integral part of the settlement we are proposing in our final offer. We would expect:

- Your side would present a complete list of all prisoners held throughout Indochina on the day an agreement is reached.
- The release of the prisoners would begin on the same day as our withdrawals under the agreed timetable.
- The release of prisoners would be completed at least two months before the completion of our final withdrawals."

Their July 12 Statements

Le Duc Tho: "You proposed the release of POWs and innocent civilians on both sides. We propose this be carried out as far as Vietnam is concerned. You propose for all of Indochina. For the release of POWs, we propose that you set a date for troop withdrawal."

Our July 12 Statements

"As for the second point, we accept your formulation with two elaborations which are drawn from our seven points. The elaborations are as follows:

- Both sides would present a complete list of military men and innocent civilians held throughout Indochina on the day agreement is reached.

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-- The release of these prisoners would begin on the same day as our withdrawal under the agreed timetable and would end on the day our withdrawals are completed.

"You will notice that we have dropped the provision that the POWs be released two months before withdrawals conclude, as a gesture of goodwill and in order to speed progress."

Their July 26 Statements

Xuan Thuy: "We feel no difficulty about the views you wanted to add (on our Point 2)."

Xuan Thuy: "A third example is on the question of POW's. This is a question of the aftermath of the war, the consequence of war. But we are prepared to settle the problems if we can come to an agreement on the military and political questions. The question of prisoners is not difficult at all."

Xuan Thuy: "After we agree on a terminal date for troop withdrawal, we can then consider the question of furnishing a list of military men and civilians captured during the war."

"Regarding the question of prisoners throughout Indochina, I have told the Special Adviser that concerning the Indochina questions we shall reach agreement here and we shall exchange views with our respective allies." (After Kissinger expressed his view that he had great confidence in their persuasive power): "I have only repeated your views expressed the other day. I agree to your views."

Le Duc Tho: "Thus, if you agree to a withdrawal date today, we will release prisoners and have an agreement."

Le Duc Tho: "How can we liberate prisoners throughout Indochina" since "you have not expressed your views on" the political questions of the Indo-chinese countries?

Our July 26 Statements

"You must understand that it is absolutely not possible to make peace unless all prisoners in Indochina are released. That is not open to discussion."

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How you accomplish this is your problem, but I have great confidence in your persuasive powers."

"And we will not settle the war just for prisoners. That is another point you should have no illusions about."

Current Situation

It remains generally agreed that POW's will be released concurrently with our troop withdrawals. But three issues remain still:

- Our POW's in Laos and Cambodia, where Hanoi wants to settle political issues first, at least according to one statement.
- The question of the Viet Cong held in South Vietnam. We speak of "innocent civilians," Hanoi simply of "civilians." The GVN would be very reluctant to release 30,000 to 40,000 Viet Cong.
- We want complete lists of all our men on the day agreement is reached; they have said they will "consider" this question after a terminal date is agreed upon.

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NVN AND US POSITIONS ON KEY ISSUES

(Through July 12, 1971)

THE POLITICAL ISSUE

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Their Position

Point 3: "In South Vietnam the U.S. should stop supporting Thieu/Ky/Khiem so that there may be set up in Saigon a new Administration standing for peace, independence, neutrality, and democracy. The PRG will enter into talks with that Administration to settle the internal affairs of South Vietnam and to achieve national concord."

Our Position

Not listed in our seven points.

Their July 12 Statements

Xuan Thuy: "I move that we should discuss at the same time the military problem and the political problem."

Le Duc Tho: "The change of Thieu is the yardstick of your desire to make peace or to continue the Vietnamization of the war. . . . We can tell you that if now you settle the question of the change of Thieu, we shall settle the question of the war not only in Vietnam but also in other countries of Indochina in a rapid way and a very satisfactory way. . . . I tell you in a serious way that you have to replace Thieu. . . ."[Then] "we shall make a big step forward and settle the problem rapidly and to the satisfaction of both parties."

Le Duc Tho: "If now you decide explicitly that you will change Thieu, then we shall immediately make our response."

Le Duc Tho: "If you do not agree it will be difficult to make progress . . . . We and the PRG want to talk with a government in South Vietnam standing for peace and for serious negotiations. . . . But with Thieu it is impossible to bring peace."

Le Duc Tho: "Because of the forthcoming elections if you want to change him, this is the opportunity to do that."

Xuan Thuy: "Another way, is if you will persuade Thieu not to present himself in the forthcoming elections. That is an easier way."

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Our July 12 Statements

"We could accept the principle of your point three in its general sense. We could agree that we are not committed to any one government in Saigon but to work in the same way with any government which exists there. We are willing to agree to a defined relationship with whatever government there is in Saigon after a peace agreement is signed. That is to say we are willing to define the precise economic, military and political relationship which a South Vietnamese government can have with us under conditions of peace. . .

"In this connection, we are prepared to look seriously at some of the thoughts contained in points 4B and 5 of the proposal presented by Mme. Binh on July 1, which recall the 1954 Geneva injunctions against foreign military alliances, foreign military bases and foreign forces.

"That is as far as we can go and as much as you can realistically expect."

"I want to point out, too, that you must have some confidence in the political evolution in Saigon, and my visit to Saigon has convinced me that the best way to begin that political evolution is to come to an agreement this summer."

"Finally, for your information, we are not opposed to the ideas about the reunification of Vietnam contained in paragraph 4A of Mme. Binh's statement."

"Concretely, what do you mean by changing the government? What are we supposed to do?"

"If, for example, you say we should not support any one candidate in the election we can easily do it. We can keep such a promise if we make it. We can make sure that we will not support him and you will know whether we are doing it or not."

"We are willing to declare that we are not supporting any one government in Saigon. But we would like to express the point in specific restrictions that we can have with whatever government exists in Saigon, no matter how it came into power. This would apply to the existing government or to any other government that might appear.

"I have pointed out that some of the ideas expressed in points 4B and 5 of Mme. Binh's proposal could form a basis of discussions."

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Their July 26 Statements

Xuan Thuy: If the political issue is not "clearly reflected" in the discussion, then "our discussions cannot make rapid progress. . . The question of South Vietnam will not be settled."

Xuan Thuy: You said "that Point 4 and Point 5 of the 7 Points of the PRG could be agreed upon. . . We have no objection to that."

Xuan Thuy: "We have been clear in saying that you should change the present ruling group headed by Nguyen Van Thieu. . . The views you expressed last time were not clear."

Le Duc Tho: "We do not mean a change of person but of policy. Because even now if you change the person, and not change the policy, if there is the same policy. . . there is no change at all. We speak of Thieu because he symbolizes and embodies this warlike and fascist policy."

Le Duc Tho: "With a person like Thieu, I do not think that he can change his policy overnight. There should be another person with another policy."

Le Duc Tho: "After the formation of a new administration favoring peace, independence, and neutrality, this new administration will enter into serious negotiations with the PRG regarding all military and political questions, including those raised by the PRG. As I told you the other time, if this change is brought about, then we will seriously, rapidly, logically and reasonably settle the problem."

Le Duc Tho: "We request a change of person and of policy. Because if you only change the person, and the policy is the same, there is no change at all. But if you keep Thieu, with such a person no change of policy is possible. Even if you affirm that such a policy is changed, the people of South Vietnam will not believe it."

Xuan Thuy: "You said that to replace Nguyen Van Thieu is beyond your power and is dishonorable. We think you have the capability to do so and are unwilling to do so."

Xuan Thuy: "We do not ask you to make a public statement. You should do that secretly. No one knows. Let you do that secretly and it will not reflect on your honor. . . This understanding is between us only. It is not divulged."

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Xuan Thuy: "What you have been saying shows that you will maintain Nguyen Van Thieu. Moreover, if you maintain Nguyen Van Thieu, it would not only be harmful to U.S. honor, but we cannot settle the problems here."

Xuan Thuy: "Secondly, on political problems, if you stick by the views of today this will be an obstacle to a settlement."

Le Duc Tho: "But there are candidates [in the South Vietnamese elections] with programs favoring peace, independence, neutrality and democracy. The people in South Vietnam, in the cities, in the countryside, approve such a candidate. There is no reason if such a candidate wins the election that we be told how."

#### Our July 26 Statements

"I am prepared to state formally that we are prepared to discuss Point 1 and Point 3, as part of a final settlement that includes all other parts. . . We are prepared to discuss political questions."

"We have told you on innumerable occasions that we cannot [replace the Administration in Saigon] because it is beyond our power to do it, and because it would be dishonorable to do it. . . You cannot expect us both to withdraw from Vietnam rapidly and to do all your political work for you."

"We are prepared to accept the outcome of any political process which develops after our departure. We believe that our withdrawal will have certain consequences, as you yourselves have repeatedly pointed out."

"The withdrawal of our forces must have certain consequences. Secondly, we believe that the announcement of our withdrawal will have consequences of a major political nature even before the withdrawal is completed. We believe that our readiness to accept some of the elements of Point 5 of Mme. Binh's proposals, specifically the provisions for neutrality, will have major political consequences in South Vietnam. We believe that an announcement of our readiness to accept certain limitations on our military assistance to the GVN will have major political consequences, first when it is announced and then when it happens. We believe that a declaration of total neutrality on our part in any political contest in South Vietnam will have major political impact both when it is announced and when it is carried out. We are prepared to make all these declarations and we are prepared to carry them out scrupulously as part of a settlement. In short, we are willing, insofar as this is in our power, to undo those distortions of the South Vietnamese political life that our presence

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and interference may have provoked. We are not prepared to take an active part in bringing about the solution you wish. We want the people of Vietnam to be genuinely free to choose their own future."

"We can make a rapid settlement, in which case the political process will start sooner."

"We are prepared in any agreement in principle which we make to state a number of political propositions such as neutrality, limitations on aid, and other matters. That in itself is a political discussion. As for the domestic structure in South Vietnam, we have always said we are not competent to discuss it alone."

"Now as for the political solution. . . we have offered to do a number of things which would make it easier for the forces you support to participate in a political process and to affect the political future. . . (Recapitulation of statements U.S. agrees to make.) We are willing to listen to other proposals along this line."

"We are willing to accept limitations on military aid to South Vietnam that you are willing to accept for yourself. It is impossible for you to say that you will accept no limitations on military aid but that other countries should."

"What we cannot do is what you ask, to make a secret agreement to replace the leader of a country which is still an ally. Which would then lead to endless debate, moreover, as to what exactly a peaceful administration is, in which you have a veto because you are the only one who knows what is meant by peaceful."

"If you expect me to come here next time prepared to tell you that we will make a secret agreement to overthrow Thieu then we will both be wasting our time. Because the President will never approve this."

"I feel an agreement in principle right now would have a greater impact on the political situation in South Vietnam than another year of war. But it is up to you to decide."

"The only other possibility is that you come up with another proposal than the secret agreement to overthrow Thieu. And we will examine it seriously."

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Current Situation:

This issue remains deadlocked. They still want us to do their political work for them, whereas we are pushing for the evolution of the political process.

They continue to insist that we get rid of Thieu. They have made clear that they want not only a change of policy but also a change of personality. And vice versa. They have offered to agree on the removal of Thieu secretly in order to save our honor (sic). They have been somewhat ambivalent in their demands ranging from a deal to overthrow Thieu, to changing policy as well as people, to our making sure the right candidate wins the election.

We have said that we will include the political issue in an agreement. We are prepared to make a statement of principles pledging a fixed withdrawal, limitations on aid, neutrality for South Vietnam, our own neutrality in the political process, and agreement to eventual reunification, as well as our readiness to define our political, economic, and military relationship with whatever government exists in South Vietnam.

We have made crystal clear we will not replace Thieu, while suggesting that our political formulations might affect the election campaign. We have said we will consider new formulations they might propose within our framework.

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NVN AND US POSITIONS ON KEY ISSUES  
(through July 12, 1971)

REPARATIONS/ECONOMIC AID

Their Position

Point 4: "The United States Government must bear full responsibility for the damages caused by the United States to the peace of the whole of Vietnam. The government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam demand from the U.S. Government reparations for the damage caused by the U.S. in the two zones of Vietnam."

Our Position

Not covered in our seven points.

Their July 12 Statements

Xuan Thuy: Regarding point four, you said the U.S. would grant economic aid to the Indochina countries. It is a voluntary act on the part of the U.S. Government. But as far as we are concerned we want something more precise. What is the essence of your statement?"

Xuan Thuy: Do you mean economic aid without repayment?"

Our July 12 Statements

"Let me talk about point four next. I believe that it is a point that will be easy in substance but difficult if you involve it with our honor. We cannot accept that as a condition of peace that we should pay reparations to end a war. On the other hand, we are prepared to declare unilaterally that we will engage in a substantial program of economic rehabilitation of the countries of Indochina. I frankly have not discussed with the President how to do this, but I have the following ideas.

"For example, the President could either make a statement in which he would declare that upon conclusion of the war we would set aside a certain sum for rehabilitation of Indochina, or make a speech asking Congress to express support for this. And this, in my judgment, could be quite a substantial sum, but I would like to discuss in Washington what the sum would be, if you are interested.

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"But we can do this only as a voluntary act, and not as a result of pressure. And I believe it is also in the interest of both our countries because this could lay the basis for a new relationship between us."

(After Xuan Thuy asks about whether it would be without repayment):  
"Substantially, yes." (Xuan Thuy: "OK.") "But I want to check the details. I think this is no problem. I don't think repayment will be a problem."

#### Their July 26 Statements

Xuan Thuy: "We have clearly stated the responsibility of the U.S. for the loss of human life and property caused during the war in both North and South Vietnam. You want to raise the question of aid. We shall consider your views."

#### Our July 26 Statements

"The President is prepared, upon signature of an agreement in principle, to go to the Congress and to recommend to the Congress a five-year program of assistance for all the countries of Indochina. The sum he is prepared to recommend to the Congress is about seven and a half billion dollars over a five-year period, of which two to two and a half billion dollars would be dedicated to North Vietnam."

"The question of repayment would not be a problem. Over two-thirds of the funds would be in outright grants. The remainder would be in very long term, very low interest rate loans which pose no practical problems of repayment. Even that is adjustable."

"There would be no conditions attached to this assistance program."

#### Current Situation

There is basic agreement on this issue, with Hanoi being ready to accept aid in lieu of "reparations" in an agreement, while probably making its own statements about our culpability. They did not react to the amount and terms of our aid. These are perhaps subject to further negotiation, but shouldn't be a real problem.

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NVN AND US POSITIONS ON KEY ISSUES  
(through July 12, 1971)

CEASEFIRE AND INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION

Their Position

Point 7: "All the parties should achieve a ceasefire after the signing of the agreements on the above mentioned problems."

Point 8: "There should be an international supervision."

Our Position

Point 3: "There should be a ceasefire in place throughout Indochina, to become effective at the time when U.S. withdrawals based on the final agreed timetable begin."

Point 4: "As part of the ceasefire, there should be no further infiltration of outside forces into the countries of Indochina."

Point 5: "There should be international supervision of the ceasefire and its provisions."

Their July 12 Statements

Le Duc Tho: "One of your points deals with, you say that there should be, international supervision of the ceasefire and its provisions. We agree in principle on this point, but on when and how a ceasefire will start, there is still disagreement between us."

Our July 12 Statements

"We accept point seven in principle, but we want to define it as follows on the basis of our points three and four: there should be a general ceasefire throughout Indochina, to begin when an agreement is signed. As part of that ceasefire, there should be no further infiltration of outside forces into all the countries of Indochina."

Their July 26 Statements

Xuan Thuy: "Regarding our Point 7, you said that you agreed in principle. You said that once agreement is reached on the above Point 6, then a

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ceasefire should be agreed. You proposed to add a few more ideas. I think your request could be considered."

Xuan Thuy: "As to our Point 8 (and our Point 9), you said that you agreed to them. I have nothing to add. When the time comes, we shall discuss these points in detail."

#### Our July 26 Statements

"Suppose we agree on a ceasefire, to give you a concrete example. The international conference would deal with the technical supervision of the ceasefire, e.g., how many teams, where they should be."

#### Current Situation

There is agreement that there should be a ceasefire, with the following issues still to be resolved:

- When does the ceasefire begin?
- What forces ceasefire, and upon whom?
- Does the ceasefire include cessation of infiltration?
- Is the ceasefire valid throughout Indochina or just Vietnam?
- Reconnaissance flights. (On May 31 Xuan Thuy said that these flights can lead to war and that the DRV, as a sovereign country, "cannot bear reconnaissance flights over our country.")
- Better understanding of international (and other) supervision.
- Better understanding on type of ceasefire (e.g., in-place or regroupment.)

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NVN AND US POSITIONS ON KEY ISSUES  
(through July 12, 1971)

INDOCHINA, THE GENEVA ACCORDS, AND  
INTERNATIONAL GUARANTEES

Their Position

Point 5: "The U.S. should respect the 1954 Geneva Agreements on Indochina and those of 1962 on Laos. It should stop its aggression and intervention in the Indochinese countries and let their people settle by themselves their own affairs."

Point 6: "The problems existing among the Indochinese countries should be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs. As far as it is concerned, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is prepared to join in resolving such problems."

Point 9: "There should be an international guarantee for the fundamental national rights of the Indochinese peoples, the neutrality of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, and lasting peace in this region."

Our Position

Point 6: "Both sides should renew their pledge to respect the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords, to respect the neutrality, territorial integrity, and independence of Laos and Cambodia. This could be formalized at an international conference."

Their July 12 Statements

LDT: "As for your Point 6, both sides should renew their pledge to support the 1954 Geneva Agreements; we agree on that and we have carried this out."

"You said there should be international acknowledgment at an international conference. We have said there should be international guarantee of the agreements, not only for Vietnam but also for Laos and Cambodia."

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Xuan Thuy: "The difference between the 7 points of Madame Binh and our 9 points have been pointed out by Mr. Le Duc Tho. But I would like to point out this very important difference: she only speaks about within Vietnam, but in our 9 points we have raised the question of the whole of Indochina. It is a very important point."

Our July 12 Statements

"Point five we accept in principle but not in the language in which it is now drafted. We are prepared to respect the 1954 and 1962 Geneva Accords on the basis of reciprocity applying to all countries. We consider phrases like "U.S. aggression" rhetorical and unacceptable and they must be removed."

"Point six, we accept the principle that the future of Indochina should be settled by the Indochinese parties on the basis of mutual respect for independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference in each other's affairs. We think that the last sentence of your point should be removed because contrary to your intentions it implies that you have special rights which I am sure you have no wish to claim."

"We accept points (8 and) 9."

Their July 26 Statements

Xuan Thuy: "With regard to Point 5, you said it would not be difficult for you to agree in principle with it, but you would like to see another formulation. We shall consider this view, this question."

"In Point 6, we have shown our goodwill in a reasonable proposal for the settlement of problems concerning the Indochinese countries. You proposed that we should remove the last sentence of our proposal. I do not understand yet the reason for your request, but we shall discuss that."

Xuan Thuy: "As to (our Point 8 and) our Point 9, you said that you agreed to them. I have nothing to add. When the time comes we shall discuss these points in detail."

Our July 26 Statements

"We believe, first, that the political solution of each country in Indochina should be discussed first by the various parties in each country. I believe,

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secondly, that this meeting here could make recommendations to the parties on some of the military issues, such as ceasefire and release of prisoners. Thirdly, there could be an international guarantee for these various arrangements and also the provision of international supervision such as you proposed in your Points 8 and 9. I do not believe personally, but we are open on this, that the exact membership of the Geneva Conference of 1954 is necessarily the best grouping to provide this, and we would be open to your suggestions on what countries would be best to provide international supervision and guarantees. We both have the same interests in this respect, to get a reasonable group, and I think we could agree."

(After discussion about the Cambodians and the Laotians and the Vietnamese each settling their affairs, and then having an international conference guarantee the agreements reached), "except for those aspects here, such as ceasefire and prisoners of war and neutralization, and of course withdrawal of our forces."

"Suppose we agree on the neutralization of all the countries of Indochina. Then an international conference can guarantee this and recognize it. We are not asking that an international conference work out the conditions of our arrangements."

#### Current Situation

There is surface agreement that the Indochinese people should settle their own problems, but no indication as to how they will be settled.

Several issues remain:

- How are the North Vietnamese and other outside forces to be handled?
- How do we involve the other Indochinese parties in a settlement?
- Who are the other responsible parties?
- Will local political agreements have to precede local ceasefires?  
(Hanoi's position on this differs in Laos and Cambodia.)
- What kind of international supervision will there be in Laos and Cambodia?

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-- What special privileges does North Vietnam have in discussing these things (and, in the case of Cambodia, should Saigon have a voice as it will probably want)?

There is agreement to respect the Geneva Accords but no concrete way to go about this.

There is also agreement on international guarantees, but no agreement on how they will be arranged. We have suggested an international conference, but Hanoi has avoided this issue.

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## PROCEDURES

This issue did not arise in the earlier discussion but it did come up on July 26, perhaps as a result of the Peking visit or because the North Vietnamese feel they need a clearer understanding of where we are going. It was they who raised it.

### Their July 26 Statements

Le Duc Tho: "But to reach an agreement on a general framework, first we agree on the two principal points, Points 1 and 3. If we agree in principle on these two questions, then other questions can be settled (cites agreement in principle on NVN Points 8 and 9 and PRG Points 4 and 5, and NVN willingness to consider Points 4, 5, 6, and 7 - but all these are "secondary ") easily. . . Now I would like to know whether you agree to this way of discussion, both military and political, and to reach a settlement, because these two questions are the spinal bone of the framework. Without the spinal bone, the framework will collapse.

"I would like to ask you another question. What is the way of negotiating now to settle the problem, the whole of the problem?"

"There is no magical way to settle the problem of Vietnam outside of serious negotiations here in Paris on the basis of our proposals and your proposals. . . In the game of chess, the decisive party to win or lose the game is the participant. There is no other way."

Xuan Thuy: "First, I agree with you on the way to conduct negotiations for a solution of Vietnamese problems. That is to say we agree to these two forums. First, this forum to discuss, to negotiate, to settle all questions of principle and a number of important details. The second forum to negotiate and settle details on the basis of the principles agreed upon. . . When there is a deadlock on Kleber Street on details, we should meet again here."

### Our July 26 Statement

"We have two categories of issues. Issues of principle and issues of technical detail. . . I therefore propose. . . that we agree here on a

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statement of principles in considerable detail, and that we give those principles to our delegations at Avenue Kleber that they work on the details there. If there is any deadlock we can meet again to try to resolve it."

"We believe, first, that the political solution of each country in Indochina should be discussed first by the various parties in each country. I believe, secondly, that this meeting here could make recommendations to the parties on some of the military issues, such as ceasefire and release of prisoners. Thirdly, there could be an international guarantee for these various arrangements and also the provision of international supervision such as you proposed in your points 8 and 9. I do not believe personally, but we are open on this, that the exact membership of the Geneva Conference of 1954 is necessarily the best grouping to provide this, and we would be open to your suggestions on what countries would be best to provide international supervision and guarantees. We both have the same interests in this respect, to get a reasonable group, and I think we could agree."

(After discussion about the Cambodians and the Laotians and the Vietnamese each settling their affairs and then having an international conference guarantee to the agreements reached), "except for those aspects here, such as ceasefire and prisoners of war and neutralization, and of course withdrawal of our forces."

"Suppose we agree on a ceasefire, to give you a concrete example. The international conference would deal with the technical supervision of the ceasefire, e.g., how many teams, where they should be. Similarly with neutrality. Suppose we agree on the neutralization of all the countries of Indochina. Then an international conference can guarantee this and recognize it. We are not asking that an international conference work out the conditions of our arrangements."

"You see we take the Special Adviser seriously when he says that we must make peace directly. I am serious about this."

#### Current Situation

There appears to be general agreement on what is discussed where, although there may be disputes as to what represents a principle, an important detail, or a minor detail.

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